In their motion, plaintiffs assert that they will be “irreparabl[y] harm[ed] if they cannot ensure worker privacy.” Mem. at 31. Steven K. Ury, General Counsel of the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), avers that his organization “routinely bring[s] complaints and claims under the various minimum working condition statutes enforced by the Department of Labor” and that complainants come forward in reliance on SEIU’s assurance that the Department of Labor will not share their identity or complaint. Decl. of Steven K. Ury, SEIU [ECF No. 2-1] (“Ury Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 6–7; see id. ¶ 8 (“Confidentiality is necessary for our ability to organize workers and represent our members.”). If the Department shares complainants’ information with unauthorized individuals or agencies, Ury explains, the “trust” between SEIU and possible complainants “will be broken ․ [which] may have a negative impact on [SEIU’s] future organization campaigns.” Id. ¶ 9. As a result, “SEIU will be harmed in its ability to file persuasive complaints with ․ the Department of Labor” and SEIU’s “mission to improve the lives of workers” will be hindered. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.
Regardless whether or not this adequately shows defendants’ challenged conduct would injure SEIU’s interest,7 see PETA, 797 F.3d at 1094, plaintiffs run into an obstacle: the second requirement of organizational standing. Nowhere does the record state that SEIU—or any other plaintiff—will use its “resources to counteract th[e] harm” alleged caused by defendants’ challenged conduct. See id. Nor does plaintiffs’ motion even allege any of them will divert resources. But D.C. Circuit precedent clearly requires both a harm and the use of resources for organizational standing. See Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1138; PETA, 797 F.3d at 1094; see also Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 369, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The record here is simply insufficient at this point.
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